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ABSTRACT
We consider firms in the context of their business ecosystems and explore how governance
choices with respect to complementors and distributors shape their competitive behavior—i.e.,
investments in new technologies. We argue that, in addition to creating differences in incentives,
governance choices play an important role in the firm’s ability to coordinate accompanying
changes in interdependent activities so as to create value from the new technology. We test our
predictions in the U.S. healthcare industry from 1995-2006. We examine how hospitals’
decisions to invest in new imaging technologies are shaped by their governance modes with
physicians—key complementors to hospitals, and with managed care organizations (MCOs)—
primary distributors of hospital and physician services. We find that hospitals pursuing alliances
with physicians are more likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing arm’slength or integrated modes, and the likelihood of investment is increasing in the scope of alliance.
Finally, hospitals pursuing tapered integration with downstream MCOs are more likely to invest
in new technologies than hospitals pursuing arm’s-length relationships. Overall, the study argues
for extending research on organizational forms to explore the link between coordination
mechanisms and competitive behavior, and to consider such choices in the context of business
ecosystems.

We thank Matthew Bidwell, Rob Burns, Olivier Chatain, Guy David, JP Eggers, Gabriel Natividad, Anne
Parmigiani, Jason Snyder, John Kimberly, Neerav Mehta, Ethan Mollick, Felipe Monteiro, Evan Rawley, Lori
Rosenkopf, Harbir Singh and participants at ACAC 2010 for helpful comments. All remaining errors are ours.

INTRODUCTION
Scholars in management have shed light on a variety of organizational forms that firms
use to manage interdependent activities, being explicit about the tradeoffs associated with the
different modes of organization (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; Harrigan, 1984; Hennart, 1993;
Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1991a). A large number of empirical studies have examined the
drivers and performance implications of firms’ governance choices. However, the literature has
been surprisingly silent on how such choices shape firms’ strategic behavior, an important
precursor to firms’ performance. Notable exceptions are Armour and Teece (1980), who
examined how vertical integration affects firms’ investments in R&D, and Mullainathan and
Scharfstein (2001), who examined how vertical integration affects firms’ investments in
production capacity.
An emergent perspective in strategy views a firm’s ability to create and appropriate value
in the context of its business ecosystem encompassing interdependent activities and value chains
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998; Porter, 1998; Teece, 2007). Ecosystems are characterized
by joint value creation and appropriation among buyers, suppliers, and complementors. The
choice of a firm’s organizational form with respect to activities in the ecosystem is among the
most important choices faced by managers (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Moore, 1996). However,
scholars have yet to systematically explore the implications of organizational forms in the
context of business ecosystems.
In this study, we consider firms’ governance choices with respect to activities in the
ecosystem and explore how such choices shape an important type of strategic behavior — i.e.,
investments in new technologies (e.g., Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1992). We suggest
that a firm’s ability to create value from a new technology may depend in part on the
accompanying changes by actors in the ecosystem, who may need to adapt in order for the new
2

technology to be successfully commercialized (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Argyres, 1995;
Rosenberg, 1976; Teece, 2007). In addition, a firm’s ability to appropriate value from the new
technology will depend on its relative bargaining power over other players in the ecosystem
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998; Porter, 1980). Drawing on organizational economics and
strategy literatures, we argue that a firm’s governance mode plays an important role in this
coordinated adaptation for value creation and competition for value capture. Hence, governance
mode is important to the firm’s decision to undertake such strategic investments. Our empirical
context allows us to examine a variety of organizational forms: arm’s-length relationships,
hierarchies, and hybrid arrangements such as alliances (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kogut, 1988) and
tapered integration (Harrigan, 1984, 1986). In so doing, we are able to explicitly consider
tradeoffs that firms face with respect to the different forms of organization.
The context for the study is the U.S. health care industry from 1995 to 2006. We focus on
three main players that constitute the delivery of health care services — hospitals, physicians,
and managed care organizations (MCOs). Each of these player’s abilities to create and
appropriate value from its own resources and capabilities is critically dependent on the other
players. However, the nature of interdependence between hospitals and physicians is distinct
from the nature of interdependence between hospitals and MCOs. On the one hand, while
hospitals provide facilities and staff to diagnose and treat the patients, the physicians are the
primary source of medical expertise for the diagnosis and the treatment. The service provided by
the physicians is a complement to the service provided by the hospitals, and hence physicians are
key complementors to the hospitals (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998: 12). On the other hand,
hospitals’ (and physicians’) services are packaged and distributed by MCOs downstream as
health plans. Hence, while the hospital-physician relationship corresponds to a firm-
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complementor relationship, the hospital-MCO relationship corresponds to a firm-buyer
relationship.
We examine a hospital’s decision to invest in new medical imaging technologies, one of
the critical technological advances that have characterized the health care industry (Burns et al.,
2000). We focus on two distinct imaging technologies: positron emission tomography (PET) and
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which have emerged at different periods in the industry. We
find that hospitals pursuing alliances with physicians are more likely to invest in new imaging
technologies than hospitals that either have an arm’s-length relationship or are integrated and
employ their own physicians. Among hospitals pursuing alliances, the likelihood of investment
in new imaging technologies is increasing in the scope of the alliance. Finally, hospitals pursuing
tapered integration with MCOs such that they use both internal and external buyers are more
likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing only arm’s-length relationships.
The results from the study, while limited to a single industry, speak to a few important
issues in the strategy literature. First, the study contributes to research on firm boundaries by
exploring the link between organizational forms and strategic behavior. We argue and show that
when the value created by a firm’s strategic investment is dependent on accompanying changes
among activities in the ecosystem, the firm’s governance choices with respect to those activities
will have an important bearing on its ability to coordinate such changes and, hence, on its
decision to undertake such strategic investments. The finding that hospitals pursuing strategic
alliances with physicians are more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals
pursuing integrated strategies reaffirms the need to consider both the costs and the benefits of
integration (e.g., Gibbons, 2005). While integration provides control over complementary
activities and may improve coordination among such activities, it may suffer from reduced
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incentives, bureaucratic costs, and influence activities (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Hence, firms may need to
consider tradeoffs regarding ownership of complementary activities, and evaluate alternative
hybrid forms that may preserve incentives while allowing for coordinated adaptation
(Williamson, 1991a). Beyond value creation, we also argue that governance choices may
influence firms’ bargaining power over other players in the ecosystem and shape value
appropriation from new technology investments (Harrigan, 1984; Porter, 1980). This effect was
most evident from our finding that hospitals pursuing tapered integration with respect to MCOs
were more likely to invest in new technologies than hospitals pursuing market-based contracting.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we believe that ours is the first study in the strategy
literature that has explicitly considered complementors in examining different types of
organizational forms and their strategic implications on focal firms. While complements are an
important part of the firm’s business environment (Brandenburger and Nalebuff; 1998, Moore,
1993; Porter, 1998; Teece, 2007), surprisingly little systematic research has been done to
examine their interaction with firm strategies and outcomes.1 We hope that our findings will
encourage scholars to expand their analysis of organizational forms from activities in the vertical
chain to also consider complements, so as to develop a better understanding of firm strategies in
the context of the business ecosystem.
Third, our result regarding hospitals being more likely to invest in new technologies
when their alliances with physicians are characterized by broader scope suggests that alliance
“design choices” among complementors may have important implications for inter-firm
coordination. Scholars analyzing inter-firm alliances and alliance portfolios within a business

1

Notable exceptions include Gawer and Henderson (2007), Pierce (2009), Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) and Adner
and Kapoor (2010).
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ecosystem may build on these findings to explore how the design of the alliance rather than its
existence per se shapes firms’ value creation and appropriation (Aggarwal, Siggelkow and Singh,
Forthcoming; Agarwal, Croson, and Mahoney, 2010; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998).
Finally, we contribute to the literature on technology adoption by showing that a firm’s
organizational form with respect to activities in the ecosystem has a significant effect on its
decision to adopt a new technology. Hence, we add to the factors considered by the adoption
literature (e.g., Geroski, 2000; Griliches, 1957; Rogers, 1995) by suggesting that the distribution
of organizational forms in a given industry plays an important role in explaining the pattern of
new technology adoption.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Faced with the opportunity of investing in new technologies, firms face important
tradeoffs (e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Mitchell, 1989; Mitchell and Singh, 1992).
On the one hand, investing in the new technology may allow a firm to assert its technology
leadership and create competitive advantage. On the other hand, given the technological and
market uncertainty, investing in a new technology may also expose a firm to significant financial
risk of whether it can profit from the new technology.
How does a firm’s organizational form with respect to activities in the ecosystem affect
its propensity to undertake new technology investments? We explore this question by drawing on
arguments from organizational economics and strategy literatures (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998;
Gibbons, 2005; Harrigan, 1984; Williamson, 1985, 1991). We create our hypotheses in the
context of a simple ecosystem comprising three distinct activities: a focal activity, a
complementary activity, and a downstream buying activity. Hence, the ecosystem comprises
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focal firms, their key complementors, and downstream buyers. Formally, we follow
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1998) in defining a player as a complementor if buyers value the
focal firm’s product more when they have the other player’s product than when they have the
firm’s product alone (p. 18). For example, manufacturers of hardware and developers of content
or software are complementors to each other. A similar relationship also exists between
providers of online services and payment gateways. We first consider governance choices
between firms and their complementors. We then consider governance choices between firms
and their downstream buyers.

Organization of Firms and Complementors
The literature in organizational economics has suggested some important tradeoffs that
exist between the market and hierarchy forms of organization These tradeoffs can be broadly
categorized along the dimensions of “cost of organization” and “adaptability of organization”
(e.g., Gibbons, 2005; Williamson, 1991a). The cost of a given organizational form entails the
intensity of incentives for the respective parties (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore,
1990), the bureaucratic costs associated with governance and decision-making (Williamson,
1975, 1985), and the influence activities in which parties attempt to influence decisions or the
allocation of resources towards their personal gain (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Adaptability
refers to the extent to which two parties can generate a coordinated response to changing market
and technological circumstances characterized by high levels of uncertainty (Barnard, 1938;
Williamson, 1991a; 1991b).2 On the one hand, while hierarchy enjoys superiority in adaptability,
it suffers from a high cost of organization. On the other hand, while market provides high-

2

We note that our treatment of the “cost of organization” excludes transaction costs which we explicitly consider
within the category of “adaptability of organization.”
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powered incentives and is not subject to bureaucratic costs or influence activities, it suffers from
limited adaptability.
The alliance form of organization exhibits characteristics of a hybrid between markets
and hierarchies (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Menard, 2004; Williamson,
1991a). It provides greater incentives than hierarchies, as partners retain autonomy over their
tasks and the associated payoffs. It also enables greater adaptability than markets, as cooperating
partners develop communication channels and codes to facilitate knowledge sharing and
coordination of interdependent tasks (Doz, 1996; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer and Singh,
1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati, Lawrence, and Puranam, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002).
Successful commercialization of a new technology often requires accompanying changes
in complementary activities within the ecosystem (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Hughes, 1983;
Rosenberg, 1976; Teece, 2007). The commercialization phase of a new technology would entail
coordinated adaptation by focal firms and complementors, who would need to make mutual
adjustments in their respective activities during a period of technological and market uncertainty
(Teece, 2007; Williamson, 1991a). A focal firm’s ability to create value from a new technology
would depend on the degree to which it can effectively coordinate accompanying changes among
complementors. As compared to market, an alliance organizational form, characterized by
cooperation between parties and the existence of communication channels and codes, is more
effective in achieving such coordinated adaptation. Hence, firms that have an alliance
relationship with their complementors would be better positioned to create value from the new
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technology, and more likely to invest in the new technology than firms that have an arm’s-length
relationship.3
Hypothesis 1: Firms that have an alliance relationship with their complementors will be
more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that have an arm’s-length
relationship.
An important feature of the integrated organizational form is that it facilitates coordinated
adaptation (Williamson, 1991a). This enhanced adaptability might make an integrated firm more
likely to invest in a new technology than firms using an arm’s-length or an alliance relationship.
However, such a prediction would have only considered the benefits while ignoring the costs of
integration. This would have been inconsistent with the theories of the firm that explicitly
recognize the need to consider both the costs and the benefits of integration. For example,
Grossman and Hart (1986) develop a theory of how common ownership shifts the distribution of
surplus created by the two complementary parties, creating incentive distortions and resulting in
underinvestment. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) develop a theory of how authority in an
integrated firm results in parties lobbying to influence decision makers for their own personal
benefit. Such influence activities are costly for an integrated firm, as they lower the quality of
decision making and divert the attention and effort of parties from more productive activities.
Finally, Williamson (1975, 1985) describes how internalizing a transaction within a firm creates
different types of bureaucratic distortions, such as procurement practices that favor internal units
despite a more profitable external alternative, and persistence tendencies that favor continuation
of unproductive or obsolete projects.

3

It is certainly plausible that alliance between focal firms and complementors can also help to increase the focal
firms’ relative bargaining power over downstream buyers. This would increase the value that a firm can capture
from the new technology and may be another reason that firms that have an alliance relationship with
complementors will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that have an arm’s-length relationship.
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As compared to an integrated form, an alliance form is relatively free from such
organizational costs, since focal firms and complementors retain autonomy over their respective
tasks. An important differentiating feature of a firm-complementor alliance as compared to a
firm-supplier alliance is that the price mechanism of the market that provides for high-powered
incentives is likely to be preserved. Compared to a firm-supplier alliance, in which long-term
contracts and high customer bargaining power can result in suppliers being governed like
organizational units, resulting in incentive attenuation (Makadok and Coff, 2009; Williamson,
1991a), a firm-complementor alliance does not necessarily alter the market-based interaction
between alliance partners and their downstream buyers.
In summary, firms that have an alliance relationship with complementors are relatively
free from the organizational costs incurred by integrated firms while retaining their ability to
achieve coordinated adaptation during the commercialization of a new technology. Hence, as
compared to integrated firms, firms that have an alliance relationship with their complementors
will be more likely to invest in a new technology.4
Hypothesis 2: Firms that have an alliance relationship with their complementors will be
more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that integrate into the
complementary activities.
Alliance Scope as a Shift Parameter
Research on alliances has suggested that the choice of alliance scope is among the most
important choices considered by partnering firms (e.g., Doz and Hamel, 1998; Khanna et al.,
1998; Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Alliance scope refers to the extent of activities that partners
4

An integrated mode is likely to be superior to an alliance mode for very high levels of adaptation. Hence, it is
possible that for such extreme cases, the benefits of adaptation may supersede the costs of organization and result in
integrated firms being better positioned to commercialize new technologies. This requires an important boundary
condition for our hypothesis—i.e., the level of adaptation associated with the commercialization of the new
technology is of a “moderate” type.
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jointly carry out through the alliance as compared to their total set of activities. The broader the
scope of activities carried out within the alliance, the greater the extent of common benefits that
alliance partners derive from their relationships (Khanna et al., 1998). Greater common benefits
help to align the incentives between partnering firms and facilitate cooperation (Agarwal et al.,
2010; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998). Broader alliance scope would also make it
easier for firms to identify and coordinate changes in the interdependent activities that will
interact with the new technology. Hence, the broader the scope of alliance between firms and
complementors, the more effective the firms will be in their commercialization of the new
technology.
The combination of hypotheses 1 and 2 suggests that we are proposing an inverted Ushaped relationship between the firm-complementor organizational form along the markethierarchy continuum and the firm’s propensity to invest in a new technology. We now suggest
that the scope of the alliance, by affecting the extent of cooperation and coordination, can act as
a shift parameter for the propensity of firms using the alliance mode to invest in a new
technology. Hence, the broader the scope of the alliance between firms and their
complementors, the greater the likelihood that firms would invest in a new technology.
Hypothesis 3: The broader the scope of the alliance between firms and their
complementors, the greater the likelihood that firms will invest in a new technology.

Figure 1 illustrates our theoretical framework linking firm-complementor organizational
form to the firm’s likelihood of investment in a new technology.
----------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
-----------------------------------------
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Organization of Firms and Buyers
Finally, we consider how firms’ governance choices with respect to downstream buyers
will affect their likelihood of investment in new technologies. Besides the arm’s-length
relationship, we consider a plural form of governance in which a firm uses both arm’s-length and
integrated strategies. This form of governance, often referred to in the strategy literature as
tapered integration (Porter, 1980), has been documented for both upstream activities (Harrigan,
1986; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; Rothaermel et al., 2006) and downstream
activities (Dutta et al., 1995; Harrigan, 1986; La Fontaine, 1992; Michael, 2000) in the firm’s
value chain.
While tapered integration with respect to downstream buyers is more costly to set up and
more complex to manage than the pure market form, its benefits include reduced information
asymmetry that mitigates hold-up hazards, greater bargaining power, and lower demand
uncertainty (Dutta et al., 1995; Harrigan, 1986; Michael, 2000; Porter, 1980). Compared to full
integration, tapered integration also limits the dulling of incentives and bureaucratic distortions,
as firms rely on both internal and external parties for downstream tasks (e.g., Porter, 1980).5
Firms pursuing tapered integration strategies will face lower risk during the
commercialization of the new technology, as they have preferred access to their downstream
buyers. Given that buyers may incur specialized investments to commercialize the new
technology, tapered integration also reduces the likelihood of hold-ups. Finally, greater
bargaining power would allow firms using tapered integration strategies to appropriate more
value from the new technology than firms pursuing market-based strategies. Hence, firms

5

Most of our arguments regarding governance choices of downstream buyers also apply to upstream suppliers.
However, we focus on the downstream buyers to maintain consistency with our empirical context.
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pursuing tapered integration with respect to downstream buyers will be more likely to invest in a
new technology than firms pursuing arm’s-length relationships.

Hypothesis 4: Firms that pursue tapered integration strategies downstream in their
vertical chains will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that pursue
arm’s-length relationships.

METHODOLOGY
Industry Background
The context for our study is the U.S. health care industry. We focus on three critical players
that constitute the delivery of health care services—hospitals, physicians, and managed care
organizations (MCOs). Our focal firms are hospitals that provide facilities and staff to diagnose
and treat patients. Physicians are the primary source of medical expertise for the diagnosis and
treatment. The service provided by the physicians is a complement to the service provided by the
hospitals, and hence physicians are key complementors to the hospitals (Brandenburger and
Nalebuff, 1998: 12). Hospitals’ (and physicians’) services are packaged and distributed by
MCOs downstream as health plans to end-users. Hence, while the hospital-physician relationship
corresponds to a firm-complementor relationship, the hospital-MCO relationship corresponds to
a firm-distributor relationship. The complementary relationship between hospitals and physicians
has also been acknowledged by Gaynor (2006) in his recent review of research on hospitalphysician relationships in the health care literature. He notes that hospitals and physicians
depend on each other for creating value and that their respective services are sold downstream to
the buyers. The simplified schema of the health care delivery ecosystem is shown in Figure 2.
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----------------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
----------------------------------------Managed Care Organization
The managed care organization (MCO) is a critical player in the delivery of health care
services. MCOs in a given market package and distribute the services offered by hospitals and
physicians as health plans. The emergence of MCOs in the early 1980s was in response to
significant escalation of health care costs under the traditional fee-for-service system, in which
patients were billed for each service provided and the claims were reimbursed from insurers. The
insurers themselves did not play any part in the management of the delivery of services such that
patients could get a service from any provider and receive a pre-determined reimbursement for
that service from the insurer. Because of the fragmented nature of the payment and delivery
functions, health care costs rose rapidly (Weisbrod, 1991).
MCOs integrated both the delivery of health care services and the payment functions, and
focused on lowering health care costs while maintaining quality. A key feature of the MCO
business model was to negotiate low rates with select providers (both hospitals and physicians)
and to offer a variety of health plans to meet the needs of different market segments. By
stimulating competition among health care providers in order for them to be considered in the
network of service providers and by enforcing strict cost controls, especially with respect to new
and more expensive services, MCOs slowed the rate of increase in health care costs (Teisberg,
Porter, and Brown, 1994). The emergence of MCOs imposed significant pressure on hospitals
and physicians to improve their competitive position by lowering their costs and/or improving
the quality of their services. In addition, hospitals and physicians took steps to increase their
bargaining power over MCOs in order to receive greater reimbursement for their services. These
14

considerations led to a wave of mergers, acquisitions, and alliances among service providers
(Bazzoli et al., 2004), as well as hospitals acquiring equity interest in some MCOs (Shortell,
Morrison, and Hughes, 1989).

Hospital-Physician Governance Forms
The health care industry provides an ideal context in which to explore the implications of
firm-complementor governance modes. The context is characterized by a wide variety of
hospital-physician governance forms that include arm’s-length relationships, alliances with
varying degrees of scope, and fully integrated organizations in which physicians are employed
by hospitals (e.g., Burns and Thorpe, 1993; Ciliberto and Dranove, 2006; Cuellar and Gertler,
2006).
On the one end of the governance continuum, an arm’s-length relationship between
hospitals and physicians entail that while physicians have admitting privileges in hospitals, they
remain independent with respect to contracting with MCOs, administrative tasks, and
information systems. On the other end of the continuum, an integrated salary model entails that
hospitals employ their own physicians.
Besides the arm’s-length and integrated modes, four different types of alliance modes are
extensively used by hospitals and physicians (AHA, 2009). A key distinguishing factor among
these hybrid choices is the scope of the activities that are carried out through the alliance
relationship. First, the Independent Practice Association (IPA) alliance entails that hospitals and
physicians pursue joint contracting with MCOs while retaining autonomy over administrative
tasks and information systems (e.g., Burns et al., 2000; Cuellar and Gertler, 2006). An IPA
alliance is relatively easy to organize and incurs minimal set-up costs. Second, the Open
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Physician Hospital Organization (OPHO) alliance is responsible for coordinating administrative
tasks between hospitals and physicians as well as negotiating and managing contracts with
MCOs. Third, in the Closed Physician Hospital Organization (CPHO) alliance, physicians are
exclusively contracted to the hospitals, and the scope of the alliance also extends to coordinating
care for the patients (e.g., Cuellar and Gertler, 2006). Finally, the Management Service
Organization (MSO) alliance emulates most of the features of the CPHO alliance except that the
joint-venture is also responsible for supporting the services of the physicians through staff and
equipment. The MSO’s services include office support, purchasing and operation of information
systems, patient billings and collections, and contract marketing and negotiations (Brown, 1996).

Data
The primary source of data for the study is the American Hospital Association (AHA),
which since 1946 has conducted yearly surveys of all registered hospitals in the United States,
with greater than an 80% response rate (AHA, 2009). Since 1995, AHA has been collecting
information on the organizational forms used by hospitals with respect to physicians. In this
study, we use AHA annual survey data from 1995 to 2006, supplemented with information on
MCOs from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and with county-level
demographic data from the Census Bureau.
The AHA database included information on 7,525 hospitals from 1995 to 2006. We
excluded approximately 8 percent of hospitals that reported multiple governance modes with
physicians. Following previous studies of technology adoption in the health care industry (e.g.,
Baker, 2001; David, Helmchen, and Henderson, 2009), we also excluded psychiatric, children’s,
and other specialty hospitals that have distinct business models or do not typically need to invest
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in the medical imaging technologies that we examine in this study (XXX). The final sample
consisted of 5,367 hospitals.6

Measures
Dependent Variable: We examine the hospital’s decision to invest in new medical
imaging technologies. These technologies have been key drivers of technological advances in the
health care industry (Burns et al., 2000). We focus on two distinct imaging technologies that
have emerged at different periods in the industry. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) is a
diagnostic technology that captures high-resolution images of body tissues to detect anomalies
such as tumors. While the origins of MRI date back to the early 1970s, its clinical use began
around 1982. Positron Emission Tomography (PET) is among the most recent diagnostic
technologies, commercialized in the early 1990s. PET provides a cross-sectional image based on
metabolic activity of cells, which enables functional level analysis of body tissues. Each of these
imaging technologies constitutes a significant investment for a hospital (Baker, 2001; Teplensky
et al., 1995). A typical investment in these technologies includes capital expenditure in excess of
$2 million to purchase the equipment and additional maintenance and personnel costs. As with
most strategic investments, hospitals face the dilemma of whether and when to invest in these
imaging technologies. An earlier investment may allow a hospital to position itself as a
technology leader (Luft et al., 1986) and gain market share over its rivals (e.g., Ho, 2009).
However, earlier investments are also made under considerable risk regarding the capability and
the implementation of the new technology, the extent of market demand, and the level of
reimbursements that the hospital will receive from MCOs (Teplensky et al., 1995).

6

We also performed additional analysis that included data from all 7,525 hospitals and our results were consistent
with the ones reported in the paper.
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Figure 3 shows the trend in the percentage of hospitals that have invested in MRI and
PET technologies from 1995 to 2006. Our dependent variable measures whether a hospital has
invested in the new imaging technology in a given year. A hospital is assumed to have invested
in the new technology during the first year that it reports the technology’s availability in the
AHA annual survey.
----------------------------------------Insert Figure 3 about here
----------------------------------------In some instances, there was inconsistency in the reported data. A hospital might report
the technology as available one year but not the next. In other cases, a hospital reported the
availability of the technology in one year but the data were missing the following year and
resumed in later years. We tested for the robustness of our findings by following the procedure
used by Baker (2001). Specifically, in the case of inconsistent data, we used as the year of new
technology investment the earliest of the first two consecutive years in which the hospital
reported the availability of the focal technology. For example, when a hospital reported the
availability of the technology in 1995, 1997, and 1998 but not in 1996, we consider the year of
investment to be 1997. In the case of missing data, we chose the year of new technology
investment as the earliest of the first three successive years in which the hospital reported the
availability of the focal technology. For example, when a hospital reported the availability in
1995, 1997 and 1998 but the data were missing in 1996, we consider the investment year to be
1995. The results from these robustness tests were fully consistent with our reported results.

Independent Variables: We measured hospital-physician governance form with dummy
variables that were coded based on the categories used in the AHA survey. Our base category of
18

governance mode is an arm’s-length relationship between hospitals and physicians in which
physicians have admitting privileges in hospitals but remain independent with respect to MCO
contracting, administrative tasks, and information systems. We used a dummy variable to code
whether the hospital formed an alliance with physicians. The variable, Complementor Alliance,
took a value of 1 if the hospital used any of the four different types of alliance with physicians –
Independent Practice Association (IPA), Open Physician Hospital Organization (OPHO), Closed
Physician Hospital Organization (CPHO) and Management Service Organization (MSO), and 0
otherwise. The dummy variable, Complementor Integration, took the value of 1 if the hospital
reported using an Integrated Salary Model (ISM).
In order to test the effect of alliance scope, we created separate categories of low,
medium, and high alliance scope. Our categorization is based on the rank ordering of the extent
of activities that hospitals and physicians carry out through the alliance as compared to their total
set of activities (e.g., Khanna et al., 1998). An IPA alliance is characterized by hospitals and
physicians collaborating on contracting with MCOs while retaining autonomy over
administrative tasks, information systems, and patient care (e.g., Burns et al., 2000; Cuellar and
Gertler, 2006). It was categorized as low alliance scope. An OPHO alliance between hospitals
and physicians not only pursued joint contracting with MCOs but also shared administrative
services. It was categorized as medium alliance scope. Finally, a hospital that used either a
CPHO or MSO alliance was categorized as having high alliance scope. In this case, physicians
are exclusively contracted to the hospital, and the activities underlying the alliance include joint
contracting with MCOs, sharing of administrative services, and coordinating patient care. While
CPHO and MSO alliance forms are very similar in their scope, as a test of robustness, we
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estimated a model that included their separate effects. The coefficients and the significance
levels were almost identical to the aggregated category.
A hospital typically works with a number of MCOs that distribute its services. Many of
these interactions are governed through arm’s-length relationships. However, several hospitals
reported as having an equity interest in at least one of the MCOs.7 For example, Sanpete Valley
Hospital (Mount Pleasant, Utah) has an equity interest in Intermountain Healthcare MCO that
distributes its services in addition to other independent MCOs such as Altius Healthplans and
Healthy U. We used a dummy variable, Buyer Tapered Integration, to identify such hospitals.

Control Variables: We controlled for a number of hospital-level and market-level
covariates that may affect a hospital’s propensity to invest in a new technology. Consistent with
the healthcare literature, Hospital Size is measured as the total number of beds. We used dummy
variables to characterize the hospital as a Medical School Member, Teaching School Member,
Not-for-Profit, or Government Owned. The hospital’s Capacity Utilization is measured as the
ratio of annual inpatient days and the total annual capacity of the hospital, obtained by
multiplying the total number of hospital beds times 365 (Banker, Conrad, and Strauss, 1986).
The hospital’s Outpatient Ratio is measured as the ratio of total number of annual outpatient
visits and the total annual number of inpatient admissions (Ciliberto, 2006). The market-level
controls include the Number of General Hospitals in the county where the hospital is located and
Market Concentration, measured as the Herfindahl index of hospital market shares in the county.
We controlled for the county’s demographic characteristics through Unemployment Rate and Per
Capita Income.
7

The question in the AHA survey specifically asked for an equity interest in MCO organizations that are associated
with health maintenance organizations and preferred provider organizations, the two most common forms of
managed care.
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Many recent studies in the health care literature have reported that the emergence of
MCOs in the 1980s has imposed excessive economic constraints on hospitals through lower
reimbursement rates and strict cost controls. As a result, these studies found that greater market
penetration of MCOs over traditional insurance organizations have lowered the propensity of
hospitals to invest in new technologies (e.g., Baker, 2001; Douglas and Ryman, 2003; Mas and
Seinfeld, 2008). The literature has used different data sources to measure the penetration of
MCOs in a given geographical market. For example, some studies have used HMO penetration
rate (e.g. Baker, 1997) whereas others have used Medicare penetration rate (e.g. Dranove, Simon,
and White, 1998). There are advantages and disadvantages with each of these data sources
(Dranove et al., 1998). In this study, we used Medicare managed care penetration rate data
(Baker, 1997) from the Area Resource File provided by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services as a measure of managed care penetration. We control for this effect through the
variable MCO Penetration, which takes a value of 1 if the percentage of Medicare enrollees in
the county exceed 15% and 0 otherwise (e.g. Baker, 2001). We tested for the robustness of our
findings by using the alternative HMO penetration level information for the year 1998 obtained
from the Area Resource File. While the standard error for the MCO penetration estimate was
larger, the magnitude and significance levels of our hypothesized covariates remain almost
unchanged.
Finally, we include state fixed effects to control for unobserved differences in health care
regulation (e.g., certificate of need) across the different states (Hillman and Schwartz, 1985).
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the variables used in the analysis.
----------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
-----------------------------------------
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Analysis
Many hospitals in our sample did not invest in the medical imaging technologies during
the period of observation. Hence, our data is right-censored. Consistent with prior studies
examining the firm’s timing of strategic investments in new technologies (e.g., Baker, 2001;
Mitchell, 1989), we used hazard rate models to test our predictions. Specifically, we used the
Cox semiparametric proportional hazards model, which allows for a fully flexible, nonparametric
baseline hazard, and hence does not require making additional assumptions about the shape of
the baseline hazard over time (Cox, 1975).
In addition, a number of hospitals in our sample had invested in the MRI technologies
prior to the first available observation in our dataset, and hence these observations were leftcensored. We follow the standard approach in the literature to exclude the observations that were
left-censored (Allison, 1982). To ensure that our results are not biased by the exclusion of these
observations, we separately estimated the effects of our covariates on the left-censored
observations using the probit model. The results from the probit model, reported in the
robustness tests section, are nearly identical to the results obtained from the Cox models.

RESULTS
Table 2 shows the summary statistics and correlations between our covariates. Table 3
reports the results from the Cox models for the two different medical imaging technologies.
Models 1 and 4 are our baseline models for the hospitals’ adoption of PET and MRI
technologies, respectively. Models 2 and 3 allow us to test our predictions using data from
hospitals’ adoption of PET technology, and Models 5 and 6 allow us to test our predictions using
data from hospitals’ adoption of MRI technology.
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----------------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
----------------------------------------The results from the baseline models are consistent with our expectations and prior
research in the health care industry (e.g., Baker and Phibbs, 2002; Hillman and Schwartz, 1985;
Robinson, 1996; Teplensky et al., 1995). On the one hand, hospitals that are large, are not-forprofit, are members of a medical school association, and have greater capacity utilization are
more likely to invest in the new medical imaging technologies. On the other hand, hospitals that
have a greater outpatient ratio and are located in more concentrated markets are less likely to
invest in the new technologies. The estimates for MCO penetration are negative and significant
for both PET and MRI technologies. Hence, our results provide continued support of prior
findings that the emergence of MCOs is negatively correlated with hospitals’ investments in new
technologies (Baker and Phibbs, 2002; Baker, 2001; Mas and Seinfeld, 2008). The coefficient for
the number of hospitals is negative but insignificant.
While we expected hospitals that are members of a teaching school association to be
more likely to invest in the new technology, we found this effect to be positive and significant
only for the PET technology. The significant and negative effect for MRI technology could be
due to the fact that many of these hospitals that had invested in the MRI technology were leftcensored and hence excluded from the sample. This was confirmed in our estimates from the
probit model using the left-censored data. Finally, the coefficient for Not-for-Profit was negative
and significant for MRI technology only.8
----------------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
----------------------------------------8

We note that studies in the health care industry have generally found mixed results with respect to differences in
technology investments between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals (e.g., Mas and Seinfeld, 2008).
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In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that firms that have an alliance relationship with their
complementors will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that have an arm’slength relationship. This prediction was supported for both technologies (Models 2 and 5). Note
that our baseline category is the arm’s-length relationship between the hospitals and the
physicians. The coefficients for complementor alliance are significant and positive for both PET
and MRI technologies. In considering the magnitude of estimated coefficients, we see that
hospitals that have an alliance relationship with physicians are 32% (33%) more likely to invest
in the PET (MRI technology) than hospitals that have an arm’s-length relationship with
physicians.
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that firms that have an alliance relationship with their
complementors will be more likely to invest in a new technology than firms that integrate into
the complementary activities. The coefficient for complementor integration is insignificant for
both PET and MRI technologies. A comparison of the coefficients for complementor alliance
with that for complementor integration using the Wald test (Table 4) reveals support for
Hypothesis 2.
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that a firm’s propensity to invest in the new technology is
increasing in the scope of the firm-complementor alliance. Consistent with our hypothesis, the
coefficient of alliance scope in Table 4 is increasing in the scope of the alliance. With the
exception of low alliance scope for the PET technology, all of the alliance scope coefficients are
positive and significant. Hospitals with low alliance scope are 21% more likely to invest in the
MRI technology than hospitals that have an arm’s-length relationship with physicians. Hospitals
with medium alliance scope are 26% (27%) more likely to invest in the PET (MRI) technology
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than hospitals that have an arm’s-length relationship with physicians. Finally, hospitals with
high alliance scope are 45% (65%) more likely to invest in the PET (MRI) technology than
hospitals that have an arm’s-length relationship with physicians. A comparison of the
coefficients for the low and high alliance scope using the Wald test supports Hypothesis 3 for
both technologies. However, the difference between the coefficients for the medium and high
alliance scope was significant only for MRI technology, and the difference between the
coefficients for the low and medium alliance scope was insignificant for both PET and MRI
technologies.
----------------------------------------Insert Table 4 about here
----------------------------------------Finally, in Hypothesis 4, we predicted that firms pursuing tapered integration strategies
downstream in their vertical chains are more likely to invest in new technology than firms
pursuing market-based strategies. This prediction was supported for both technologies. The
coefficient for buyer tapered integration is significant and positive for both PET and MRI
technologies. Hospitals that use tapered integration strategies with MCOs are 15% (25%) more
likely to invest in PET (MRI) technology than hospitals that use only arm’s-length relationships.

Robustness Tests
An important issue to consider with our analysis is the possibility of hospitals self
selecting into the different governance modes that could potentially bias our estimates. In order
to test the robustness of our results to this potential endogeneity bias, we used a matching
estimator approach. Matching estimators have been widely used in economics and have recently
been used by scholars in management to address selection bias in empirical specifications (e.g.,
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Gonzalez and Pazo, 2008; Rawley and Simcoe, 2009; Sampson, 2005; Zhao, 2009). This nonparametric approach compares the statistical results obtained in a treatment group with those
obtained in a comparable control group. The main purpose of the matching estimator is to try to
reestablish the conditions of a natural experiment so that the comparison between the two groups
allows for a causal inference (Abadie, Drukker et al., 2004). We use matching estimators to
evaluate the effect of hospital-physician and hospital-MCO governance modes on the hospital’s
propensity to invest in new imaging technologies. Our control group is drawn from the hospitals
that maintained the same organizational form throughout the period of study. Our treatment
group is drawn from the hospitals that shifted their organizational form.
We briefly illustrate the specification that we use to estimate our results. Let i index the
hospital in our sample, and let T be a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if hospital shifts
its governance mode and 0 otherwise. Let Yi(T) represent the hospital’s decision to invest in the
new technology. So Yi(0) represents the hospital’s decision to invest if it had maintained its
governance mode, and Yi(1) represents the same hospital’s decision to invest if it had shifted its
governance mode. Clearly, if both results were simultaneously observed, the effect of the
hospital-physician and hospital-MCO governance choice for hospital i, Yi(1)−Yi(0), would be
directly observable. The population average of this effect could be obtained as E[Y(1)−Y(0)], and
its sample counterpart as (1/N)

1

0 , where N is the number of hospitals.

However, Yi(1) and Yi(0) are not simultaneously observable. For example, in our study, we
cannot observe the same hospital to shift from alliance to integration and maintain the alliance
mode as well. In other words, the two events - shifting and maintaining the governance mode are
mutually exclusive.
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The matching estimators provide an alternative approach. Let j (while i≠j) index the
hospitals in our sample, and assume that hospitals i and j closely match each other based on the
observables. By observing Yi(0)and Yj(1), we can use Yj(1) as a counterfactual value of Yi(1). We
use the bias-corrected nearest-neighbor matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens
(2006) to find the counterfactual value.9 For each hospital i, the standard nearest-neighbor
matching estimator searches for the most similar hospital with the opposite treatment. We match
hospitals based on hospital attributes, MCO penetration, market competition, and demand.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 plot the kernel densities of the propensity scores for the unmatched and
matched treatment and control groups. The effectiveness of our matching procedure is evident
from greater similarity in kernel densities among the matched groups as compared to the
unmatched groups.
----------------------------------------------------------Insert Figures 4, 5, and 6 about here
----------------------------------------------------------Our main results are supported if we find that the difference in the likelihood of
investment between the treatment and the control groups is significant in our predicted direction.
For example, with respect to Hypothesis 1, our control group comprises hospitals that use an
alliance mode, and the matched treatment group comprises hospitals that shift from an alliance to
an arm’s-length relationship with physicians. Hypothesis 1 is supported if we find that the
hospitals in the treatment group are less likely to invest in the new imaging technology than
similar hospitals in the control group. The results, reported in Table 5, are fully supportive of
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. While we would have preferred to test the robustness of all hypotheses,
9

This was implemented in STATA 10.0 using the NNMATCH procedure provided by Abadie, Herr, et al. (2004).
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we are limited by our data. Only a small number of hospitals have changed the scope of the
alliance during the period of study, and hence we are unable to create robust control and
treatment groups to test Hypothesis 3.
----------------------------------------Insert Table 5 about here
----------------------------------------Another potential concern with our analysis is that in estimating the hospital’s likelihood
of investment in MRI technology, we excluded a large number of hospitals who had adopted the
technology prior to our window of observation. It is possible that the exclusion of these leftcensored observations may have created a selection bias in our sample. To ensure that our results
for the MRI technology are not biased by the exclusion of these hospitals, we performed a crosssectional analysis using a probit model for the year 1995, the first year of observation in the
study. The estimated results from the probit model, reported in Table 6, are nearly identical to
the results from the Cox models and provide additional support for our predictions.
----------------------------------------Insert Table 6 about here
----------------------------------------DISCUSSION
The organization of activities within and outside firm boundaries has long been of
interest to scholars in economics and strategic management. Scholars have shed light on a variety
of organizational forms that firms use to manage interdependent activities, being explicit about
the tradeoffs associated with the different governance modes (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998;
Harrigan, 1986; Hennart, 1993; Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1991a). This study contributes to
that literature by examining the relationship between firms’ governance choices and an important
type of strategic behavior — i.e., investments in new technologies. We expand the analysis of
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organizational forms from the literature’s focus on the upstream and downstream activities in the
firm’s vertical chain to also consider complements that are a vital part of the firm’s business
ecosystem (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1998; Teece, 2007). Our central premise is that by
facilitating the coordination of changes that underlie the commercialization of new technology
and by enhancing the firm’s strategic position with respect to other players in its ecosystem, a
firm’s organizational form plays an important role in creating and capturing value from
investments in new technology.
We test our arguments in the context of the U.S. health care industry from 1995 to 2006.
We explore how hospitals’ investments in new imaging technologies are shaped by their mode of
governance with physicians—key complementors to hospitals—and with MCOs—primary
distributors of hospital and physician services. We find that hospitals that pursue alliances with
physicians are more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals that either have
an arm’s-length relationship with physicians or are integrated and employ their own physicians.
We also find that among hospitals pursuing alliances with physicians, the likelihood of
investments in new imaging technologies is increasing in the scope of the alliance. Finally, we
find that hospitals that pursue tapered integration strategies with MCOs such that they use both
hierarchy- and market-based governance modes are more likely to invest in new imaging
technologies than hospitals that use only market-based governance.
The study contributes to some important issues in the strategy literature. While a vast
body of empirical literature has explored the determinants and performance implications of firm
boundaries and governance modes, the literature has been surprisingly silent on how such
governance choices affect strategic behavior, an important precursor to firm performance within
its competitive environment. We hope that our results would encourage scholars to integrate their
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examination of coordination among interdependent activities with that of competition among
rivals and other players in the ecosystem so as to improve our understanding of firm strategies
and competitive advantage.
We believe that ours is the first study in the strategy literature that has explicitly
considered complements in examining different types of organizational forms and their strategic
implications for focal firms. In contrast to the predominant supply-side efficiency considerations
that are made with respect to firms’ governance modes, the analysis of complements allows for
the inclusion of demand side benefits that firms may enjoy by coordinating complementary
activities and enhancing the value of their focal products or services.
An interesting result of the study was the inverted U-shaped relationship that we
observed with respect to the hospital-physician governance choices along the market-hierarchy
continuum and the likelihood of technology investment. Hospitals pursuing alliances with
physicians were more likely to invest in new imaging technologies than hospitals pursuing either
arm’s-length or integrated modes. While scholars have emphasized the tradeoffs that exist
between market- and hierarchy-based organizational forms (Dyer, Kale, and Singh, 2004;
Gibbons, 2005; Williamson, 1991a), our results support the conjecture that the hybrid alliance
form may provide a more balanced mode of organization that allows for coordination while
preserving incentives. This result also supports call for empirical research on firm boundaries to
consider a broader set of governance modes (e.g., Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) in order to
better understand the tradeoffs associated with each of the organizational forms.
The literature on strategic alliances has provided useful dimensions to help characterize
the different types of alliances. Among them, the scope of the alliance between alliance partners
has been widely recognized to be an important “design” choice (e.g., Doz and Hamel, 1998;

30

Khanna et al., 1998). Our results reinforce the need to consider the variance in alliance scope
rather than the existence of the alliance per se. Moreover, alliances between complementors are
becoming increasingly prevalent and we hope that our study would encourage scholars
examining firms’ alliance portfolios to explicitly consider alliance between complementors as
part of the firms’ alliance strategies.
Finally, our findings contribute to the understanding of technology adoption in the
context of business ecosystems. We add to the factors considered by the adoption literature (e.g.,
Geroski, 2000; Griliches, 1957; Rogers, 1995) by suggesting that the distribution of
organizational forms in a given industry would play an important role in explaining the pattern of
new technology adoption. For example, the relative distribution of hospitals that have an alliance
relationship with physicians would affect the pace with which hospitals adopt new imaging
technologies. Scholars examining patterns of technology adoption could benefit from an explicit
consideration of heterogeneity in organizational forms in explaining the rate of technology
adoption. The consistency in the results among the two technologies in which we examined the
adoption patterns of different types of adopters (Rogers, 1995) - innovators and early adopters in
the case of PET technology and majority adopters in the case of MRI technology, provide further
evidence that our theorized mechanisms are likely to be independent of some of the dominant
explanations in the adoption literature.
While we have taken care in this examination, the study of course has a number of
limitations. It is conducted in the context of a single industry and we are unable to establish the
generalizability of our findings across different settings. It will be of interest to see whether our
results can be replicated in other contexts and what boundary conditions may be needed to
extend the generalizability of our findings. Our focus on medical imaging technologies, while
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allowing for an examination of a significant technology investment by hospitals, precludes us
from making generic assertions on all forms of technology investments. For example, our
predictions are based on a key premise that the successful commercialization of technologies
requires coordinated changes between focal firms and complementors. It is possible that certain
technological investments may not have a direct bearing on complementary activities and
therefore, will be outside the scope of our predictions. Another important caveat of this study is
that we are not implying a correspondence between a firm’s technology investment and its
performance outcome. We are merely suggesting a correspondence between a firm’s
organizational form and its propensity to invest in new technologies. Hence, we make no claims
that in our context, alliances are a superior form of governance. Finally, while we have
attempted to address the endogeneity bias that may exist due to hospital’s self-selection into the
different governance modes through additional robustness tests, we cannot fully address this
possibility.
In conclusion, the study situates a firm in the context of its business ecosystem
encompassing interdependent activities and value chains. It explores how organizational choices
- arm’s-length contracting, alliance or ownership, with respect to complementary activities and
downstream distribution affect the firms’ investments into new technologies. We contribute to
the literature on firm boundaries by considering how boundary choices and governance modes
shape firm behavior within the competitive environment. We also move beyond the literature’s
focus on upstream inputs and downstream distribution to also consider complements that form an
important part of the firm’s business environment. We hope that our results would encourage
scholars to extend research on firm boundary and governance choices to explore the link between
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coordination mechanisms and competitive behavior, and to consider such choices in the context
of the business ecosystems.
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Figure 1: An integrative framework linking firm-complementor organizational form and
the firm’s likelihood of investment in a new technology

Figure 2: Simplified schema of the health care delivery ecosystema
a

Lines indicate service contracts and arrows indicate the flow of services in return for payments (patient copayments, though present from end-users to physicians and hospitals, are not considered here, as they are a
significantly small proportion of the total payment.
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Figure 3: Percentage of hospitals that have invested in PET and MRI imaging technologies
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Figure 4: Propensity score of treatment (arm’s-length) and control (alliance) groups before and after
matching
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Figure 5: Propensity score of treatment (integrated) and control (alliance) groups before and
after matching
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Figure 6: Propensity score of treatment (MCO tapered integration) and control (arm’slength) groups before and after matching
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Table 1: Description of variables
Variables

Description

Dependent Variable
Hospital’s Technology Investment

Dummy=1 for the year the hospital invested in the technology

Independent Variables
Complementor Alliance
Low Alliance Scope
Medium Alliance Scope
High Alliance Scope
Complementor Integration
Buyer (MCO) Tapered Integration

Dummy=1 for the hospitals that have an alliance relationship with physicians
Dummy=1 for the hospitals that use IPA alliance form
Dummy=1 for the hospitals that use OPHO alliance form.
Dummy=1 for the hospitals that use CPHO and MSO alliance forms
Dummy=1 for the hospitals that have an integrated salary model and employ
physicians
Dummy=1 for the hospitals that have an equity relationship with an MCO

Control Variables
Hospital Effects
Hospital Size
Medical School Affiliation
Teaching School Member
Not-for-Profit
Government Owned
Outpatient Ratio
Capacity Utilization
Competitive Effects
Market Concentration
Number of Hospitals
MCO Effect
MCO Penetration
Demand Effects
Unemployment Rate
Per Capita Income

Number of beds in the hospitals
Dummy=1 for the hospitals that are members of medical school association
Dummy=1 for the hospitals that are affiliated with teaching school association
Dummy=1 for the hospitals that are owned by not-for-profit institutions
Dummy=1 for the hospitals that are owned by the government
The ratio of total number of annual outpatient visits and the total annual number of
inpatient visits for a given hospital.
The ratio of hospital’s total inpatient days over the number of beds multiplied by 365
HHI index based on hospital’s share of beds in a given county
Number of general hospitals in a given county
Dummy=1 if Medicare managed care penetration is greater than 15%
Unemployment rate in % for those 16 years and older in a given county
Per capita income of the county in 0000s
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Table 2: Correlation matrix

Mean

S.D.

1

2

3

4

1

Low Alliance Scope

0.086

0.280

1

2

Medium Alliance Scope

0.091

0.288

-0.10 1

3

High Alliance Scope

0.055

0.229

-0.07 -0.08 1

4

Complementor Integration

0.187

0.390

-0.15 -0.15 -0.12 1

5

Buyer(MCO) Tapered Integration 0.097

0.296

0.03

6

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0.09

0.05

0.02

1

Hospital Size

137.66 152.23 -0.02 0.03

0.07

0.05

0.05

1

7

Medical School Affiliation

0.239

0.426

-0.02 0.00

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.35

1

8

Teaching School Member

0.037

0.188

-0.02 -0.02 0.05

0.05

0.03

0.36

0.34

1

9

Not-for-Profit

0.511

0.500

-0.01 0.08

0.01

0.03

0.08

0.09

0.01

10 Government Owned

0.313

0.464

-0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.11

-0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05

11 Market Concentration

0.516

0.361

-0.02 0.00

0.02

12 # of hospitals

6.963

14.450 0.09

-0.01 0.01

-0.04 -0.02 0.17

0.13

0.10

0.00

-0.13 -0.48 1

13 MCO Penetration (>15%)

0.319

0.466

-0.03 0.00

0.00

-0.02 0.11

0.06

0.08

0.02

-0.09 -0.32 0.33

14 Outpatient Ratio

25.876 51.586 0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.01 0.01

0.00

-0.01 0.02

15 Capacity Utilization

0.576

0.501

-0.01 -0.01 0.00

0.03

-0.01 0.15

0.06

0.02

16 Unemployment Rate

0.053

0.024

0.03

0.01

-0.02 -0.04 0.04

17 Per Capita Income

24846.6 7979.00 0.01

0.00

0.02

0.05

0.02

-0.04 0.03

0.04

0.11

0.14

15

16

17

-0.69 1

0.10

1

0.01
0.07

1

-0.01 0.00

-0.03 -0.14 0.07

-0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.04

-0.06 0.20

14

1

-0.32 -0.24 -0.19 -0.03 0.22

0.07

13

0.04

-0.18 -0.46 0.23

0.05

1
0.00

1

-0.02 0.00

-0.03 1

0.23

0.10

0.00

-0.24 1

Correlations greater than .01 or smaller than -.01 are significant at p <.5, N= 37382
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Table 3: Cox proportional hazards estimates for a hospital’s investment into new imaging
technology
PET Technology
Model 2
Model 3
0.228***
(0.066)
0.086
(0.105)
0.234**
(0.091)
0.370***
(0.102)
0.042
0.043
(0.079)
(0.079)
0.148*
0.152*
(0.087)
(0.087)
0.002***
0.002***
0.002***
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
0.287***
0.288***
0.279***
(0.074)
(0.074)
(0.074)
0.294***
0.298***
0.296***
(0.102)
(0.102)
(0.102)
0.123
0.118
0.114
(0.090)
(0.090)
(0.091)
-0.268**
-0.253**
-0.254**
(0.108)
(0.108)
(0.108)
-0.659*** -0.679*** -0.666***
(0.120)
(0.120)
(0.120)
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.132*
-0.120*
-0.122*
(0.071)
(0.071)
(0.071)
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.0472**
0.0480**
0.0480**
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.021)
-0.064*** -0.067*** -0.065***
(0.017)
(0.000)
(0.017)
-0.076**
-0.087**
-0.081**
(0.038)
(0.038)
(0.039)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5367
5367
5367
36833
36828
36828
-10117
-10109
-10106
Model 1

Complementor Alliance (H1)
Low Alliance Scope
Medium Alliance Scope
High Alliance Scope
Complementor Integration
Buyer Tapered Integration (H4)
Hospital Size
Medical School Affiliation
Teaching School Member
Not-for-Profit
Government Owned
Market Competition
# of hospitals
MCO Penetration (>15%)
Outpatient Ratio
Capacity Utilization
Unemployment Rate
Per Capita Income
State Fixed Effects
Number of Hospitals
Observations
Log Likelihood

MRI Technology
Model 5
Model 6
0.286***
(0.048)
0.193***
(0.069)
0.239***
(0.069)
0.501***
(0.077)
-0.053
-0.052
(0.064)
(0.064)
0.227***
0.234***
(0.064)
(0.064)
0.002***
0.002***
0.002***
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
0.426***
0.444***
0.442***
(0.060)
(0.060)
(0.060)
-0.213*
-0.240**
-0.249**
(0.111)
(0.111)
(0.111)
-0.158**
-0.169*** -0.166***
(0.064)
(0.064)
(0.064)
-0.534*** -0.519*** -0.512***
(0.073)
(0.073)
(0.073)
-0.407*** -0.403*** -0.400***
(0.086)
(0.086)
(0.086)
-0.001
-0.001
-0.000
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.146*** -0.140*** -0.140***
(0.054)
(0.054)
(0.054)
-0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.0229
-0.0147
-0.016
(0.074)
(0.072)
(0.072)
-0.043*** -0.044*** -0.043***
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
-0.234*** -0.234*** -0.242***
(0.039)
(0.039)
(0.039)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3947
3947
3947
18919
18916
18916
-17742
-17704
-17699
Model 4

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Our baseline category of hospital-physician governance mode is the arm’s-length relationship.
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Table 4: Difference between coefficients estimates using Wald test

PET
Technology
H2
H3

Null Hypothesis

Chi2(2)

Prob > Chi2

Complementor Alliance = Complementor Integration

4.76

0.029

Low Alliance Scope = High Alliance Scope

4.50

0.034

Null Hypothesis

Chi2(2)

Prob > Chi2

Complementor Alliance = Complementor Integration

24.94

0.000

Low Alliance Scope = High Alliance Scope

10.52

0.001

MRI
Technology
H2
H3

Table 5: Sample average treatment effect for hospital’s investment in the PET technology
Hypothesis

Predicted
Sign

Coefficienta

H1 (Complementor Alliance vs.
Arm’s-Length)

-ve

-0.068**
(0.039)

H2 (Complementor Alliance vs.
Integration)

-ve

-0.062**
(0.036)

H4 (Buyer Tapered Integration
vs. Arm’s-Length)

+ve

0.064**
(0.031)

Hospitals in
Treatment Group
144
(Alliance to Arm’sLength)
306
(Alliance to
Integration)
271
(Arm’s-length to
Tapered Integration)

a

Sample average treatment effect for the treatment group
*Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Probit estimates for a hospital’s investment in MRI technology in 1995

Complementor Alliance

Model 7
0.351***
(0.058)

Low Alliance Scope
Medium Alliance Scope
High Alliance Scope
Complementor Integration
Buyer (MCO) Tapered Integration
Hospital Size
Medical School Affiliation
Teaching School Member
Not-for-Profit
Government Owned
Market Competition
# of hospitals
MCO Penetration (>15%)
Outpatient Ratio
Capacity Utilization
Unemployment Rate
Per Capita Income
State Dummies
Observations
R2
Log Likelihood

-0.160*
(0.085)
0.171**
(0.067)
0.00242***
(0.000)
0.174**
(0.085)
0.0273
(0.132)
-0.117
(0.088)
-0.502***
(0.094)
-0.282***
(0.101)
-0.00781***
(0.002)
0.00223
(0.096)
-0.00661***
(0.002)
0.164
(0.154)
-0.0412***
(0.013)
0.0889
(0.069)
Yes
3298
0.1968
-1747.1747

Model 8

0.132
(0.089)
0.436***
(0.082)
0.518***
(0.100)
-0.156*
(0.085)
0.160**
(0.067)
0.00239***
(0.000)
0.167**
(0.085)
0.0329
(0.133)
-0.121
(0.088)
-0.500***
(0.094)
-0.277***
(0.102)
-0.00722***
(0.002)
0.00769
(0.097)
-0.00688***
(0.002)
0.142
(0.154)
-0.0423***
(0.013)
0.0747
(0.070)
Yes
3298
0.1994
-1741.4927

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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